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For another thing, the division of medical opinion about the matter at
most means uncertainty, a factor that signals the presence of risk, not its
absence. That division here involves highly qualified knowledgeable
experts on both sides of the issue.—Stenberg v. Carhart, 20001
While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to
abort the infant life they once created and sustained.—Gonzales v.
Carhart, 20072
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I. INTRODUCTION
Medical literature on abortion largely supports pro-choice legal claims. In turn,
progressive lawyers often call for “evidence-based approaches” to lawmaking on the
assumption that it will produce pro-choice legal and regulatory outcomes. This article
argues that the evidence-based approach is no longer a reliable or stable strategy for
pro-choice lawyering given transformations in judicial treatment of medical
knowledge and a shifting evidentiary base.3
Drawing on landmark cases from 1973 to 2012, this article demonstrates how the
Supreme Court and lower courts selectively utilize medical expertise and evidence to
liberalize or constrain abortion access. With Roe v. Wade, 4 the Supreme Court began
its engagement with medical evidence and expertise intending to liberalize abortion.
The Court relied on medical knowledge that lent credibility to progressive arguments,
while dismissing evidence that supported conservative claims. In doing so, the court
treated evidence supporting progressive claims as objective and neutral and discounted

3

I use the term progressive to describe lawyers and public health practitioners that support the
liberalization laws. I use pro-choice and progressive interchangeably. I use conservative to describe lawyers
and public health practitioners that support limiting access to abortion. I use pro-life and conservative
interchangeably.
4
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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claims that supported limiting access to abortion. This has now flipped—the Supreme
Court and lower courts often treat medical evidence and expertise that supports
conservative claims as objective and neutral. These newly-legitimated conservative
ideas about abortion provide the foundation for the vast proliferation of informed
consent laws that regulate provider-patient interaction at the most minute level—
mandating that women seeking abortion look at sonograms and hear the fetal
heartbeat, as well as scripting physician disclosures.5 This new reality is exemplified in
Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, a Fifth Circuit case
regarding the Texas 2011 Women’s Right to Know Act, in which the court heralds
conservative expert and evidentiary claims as objective while discounting progressive
assertions.6
Given the transformation in the development and use of medical evidence and
expertise, I argue that progressive lawyering strategies on the issue of abortion should
delink legal advocacy from its nearly absolute reliance on “evidence based
approaches.” This is a novel, transformative, and controversial recommendation that
challenges the nearly universally held position that abortion rights advocacy should
rely on medical evidence and expertise. In keeping with reproductive rights advocacy,
health law scholars support the idea that an evidence base, when developed with rigor
and attention to methodology, lends itself to better judicial outcomes.7 In making this
argument, progressive lawyers often overestimate the objectivity of scientific and
medical expertise and under-theorize the role of politics in judicial decision-making.
The position of progressive lawyers implicitly runs against the argument made by
constitutional legal theorists who argue that it is necessary to understand purportedly
objective legal thinking in the context of politics and ideology.8 Similarly, STS
scholars argue that science, evidence, and expertise emerge from society and that the
court not only uses knowledge it also produces what we know.9 Drawing on insights

5
See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS FOR
ABORTION (2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf (discussing state laws
requiring counseling and/or waiting periods prior to receipt of abortion services). For abortion clinic
closures, in general, see Esme E. Deprez, Abortion Clinics Close at Record Pace After States Tighten Rules,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 3, 2013, 8:52 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-03/abortion-clinicsclose-at-record-pace-after-states-tighten-rules.html; Stephanie Lucero, Abortion Clinics Start Closing Across
Texas, CBS DFW (Nov. 1, 2013, 6:35 AM), http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2013/11/01/abortion-clinics-startclosing-across-texas/; Darrel Rowland & Alex Felser, More Ohio Abortion Clinics Closing, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (Oct. 16, 2013, 6:48 PM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2013/10/16/1016abortion-clinics-closing.html.
6
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
7
See, e.g., LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1867-1973 (1997).
8
See e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36
J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006); Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional
Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008).
9
See SHEILA JASANOFF, STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF SCIENCE AND SOCIAL
ORDER 2-3 (2007). Jasanoff defines co-production as:
[S]horthand for the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the
world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live
in it. Knowledge and its material embodiments are at once products of social work and
constitutive of forms of social life; society cannot function without knowledge any more
than knowledge can exist without appropriate social supports. Scientific knowledge, in
particular, is not a transcendent mirror of reality. It both embeds and is embedded in social
practices, identities, norms, conventions, discourses, instruments and institutions – in short,
in all the building blocks of what we term the social. The same can be said even more
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from constitutional legal theory, health law, feminist legal theory,10 and the field of
science, technology, and society (STS),11 this paper argues that the use of medical and
scientific evidence and expertise, rather than produce determinate outcomes, as
asserted by progressive health and reproductive rights advocates often proves
indeterminate. For example, in the 2000 Supreme Court case Stenberg v. Carhart, the
Court’s examination of conflicting evidence and expertise on an abortion procedure
resulted in a progressive outcome.12 In the 2007 Supreme Court case Gonzales v.
Carhart, nearly identical evidence and expertise resulted in a conservative outcome.13
Understanding the complicated role of medical evidence in adjudication requires an
exploration of how courts and lawmakers use medical expertise and evidence to code
the political projects of courts, how medical experts with conflicting opinions
legitimate themselves through participating in adjudication, and how medical expertise
and evidence constrains judicial decision-making. Importantly, rather than the Court
simply consuming and adjudicating factual information about abortion, the Court itself
becomes a site for production of new facts and knowledge about abortion. 14
Given the indeterminacy of outcomes, how should progressive lawyers proceed?
This analysis offers a series of strategic interventions designed to recalibrate
progressive lawyering for reproductive health. These interventions are rooted in the
feminist critique of science.15 In assessing the social and political context in which
evidence emerges, this paper takes a critical view of the “objectivity” of knowledge
about abortion.16 This approach revives an important piece of lawyering and advocacy

forcefully of technology.
Id.
10
For an example of feminist legal theory scholarship, see Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable
Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008). Martha
Fineman’s work on vulnerability provides a particularly helpful lens by which to understand institutions as
vulnerable. In this paper, the idea of institutional vulnerability allows us to see the clinic as a vulnerable
institution. Fineman defines the institutional vulnerability:
Of course, societal institutions can ameliorate or complicate our vulnerability, but
they should also be understood as vulnerable entities in and of themselves. We know that
societal institutions are not foolproof shelters, even in the short term. They may fail in the
wake of market fluctuations, changing international policies, institutional and political
compromises, or human prejudices….Further this institutional vulnerability is almost
always obscured, and those in control of institutions have a powerful interest in
disclaiming the appearance of any vulnerability.
11
For an example of STS scholarship, see Donna Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science
Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 575 (1988).
12
See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
13
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
14
See Post & Siegel, supra note 8, at 556.
15
For an example of the feminist critique of science, see Haraway, supra note 11.
16
The idea that science is socially constructed emerges from a long lineage of scholarship on the
production of knowledge in society. In recent history, these ideas are traced back to the 1962 publication of
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In his book, Kuhn argues, amongst other points, that
the people who produce scientific knowledge (the scientists) should be understood contextually, allowing an
interrogation of the production of scientific ideas. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). Kuhn’s book helped to pave the way for sociologists and historians to
begin to study the nature of science as well as the specific sociological study of science and technology.
Since 1962, the critical study of science can be found in law, economics, sociology, gender studies, and
public health, amongst other disciplines. In its contemporary form, this perspective often falls under the
heading of “science, technology, and society” or “science and technology studies” (STS). For a history of
STS, see, generally, Sheila Jasanoff, A Field of Its Own: The Emergence of Science and Technology Studies,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 191-205 (Robert Frodeman & Julie Thompson Klein
eds., 2012). For examples of work drawing on STS in law as well as economics, see, generally, Andrew
Lang, Governing ‘As If’: Global Subsidies Regulation and the Benchmark Problem, in 67 CURRENT LEGAL
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for health: the critique of science, evidence, and expertise. It is a call to return to the
skepticism offered to us by two of the most successful health movements in recent
history—the feminist women’s health movement and the AIDS movement.17 For
some, this is a frightening proposition that will lead to assertions unmoored from
“truth” or “fact.” I argue instead that we need to revive this critique of evidence and
expertise to maintain an analytic agility necessary to understanding the material
consequences of a long-term transformation in the knowledge environment around
abortion. Without sensitivity to the social construction of evidence and expertise, we
will be unable to understand how the courts enable and legitimate shifts in the
evidentiary base on abortion that result in a rapid decrease in abortion access.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II analyzes four crucial Supreme Court
decisions, Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,18 Stenberg v. Carhart, and
Gonzales v. Carhart, to understand how the role of medical and scientific evidence in
each decision changes from deferring to expertise and evidence supporting progressive
views on abortion to eventually legitimizing conservative claims. This analysis
facilitates an understanding of how the courts co-produce knowledge about abortion,
and how some ideas about abortion become naturalized and taken as “fact” over time.
Part III considers the impact of Supreme Court decisions on access to abortion services
through the circulation of newly legitimized scientific, medical, and public health
facts. I focus on Lakey, in which the claim that abortion has negative mental health
consequences justified conservative demands for the imposition of heightened
informed consent requirements for women seeking abortion against the wishes of
progressive advocates.19 Given the transformation in Supreme Court and state court
jurisprudence on abortion, Part IV draws on critiques offered by the feminist women’s
health movement to reimagine reproductive justice advocacy. I argue that we should
find regulatory interventions that seek both to reset the advocacy agenda for
progressive lawyering on abortion and to reinvigorate the longstanding (but forgotten)
critique of evidence and expertise in health law advocacy.
II. ROLE OF SCIENCE AND MEDICAL EXPERTISE IN THE ABORTION
JURISPRUDENCE: RE-READING ROE, CASEY, STENBERG AND GONZALES
Both medical expertise and law are embedded in social, historical, and political
environments.20 In turn, we must view the actors in this current study—judges,
lawyers, researchers, and physicians—as similarly embedded in these social, historical,
and political environments. 21
Understanding how medical evidence and expertise shaped abortion jurisprudence
requires a close reading of four landmark decisions: Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, Stenberg v. Carhart, and Gonzales v. Carhart. To be clear, this is not simply

PROBLEMS 135 (Robert Chambers et al. eds., 2014); Haraway, supra note 11; Sally Engle Merry, Measuring
the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S83 (2011).
17
See STEVEN EPSTEIN, INCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE IN MEDICAL RESEARCH 54-73
(2007) (discussing the role of the women’s health movement and the AIDS movement in the context of a
broader politics of inclusion-and-difference in state policy making).
18
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
19
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012).
20
Legal realism thinks about law in social context. See generally OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW (1881). The social studies of science have also sought to understand science in social
context. See, e.g., Kuhn, supra note 16. More recently, scholars have attempted to understand the role of
expertise and experts on broader questions, including economics. See, e.g., JAMES R. HACKNEY, UNDER THE
COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL-ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY (2007).
21
See Haraway, supra note 11, at 591.
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an inquiry into when and in which context the Court cited to the “best evidence.”
Instead this section seeks to, first, show how evidence codes political decisions in the
technicality of expert knowledge. Second, the analysis shows how the invocation and
deployment of medical evidence and expertise has indeterminate outcomes.22 Third, it
shows how courts increasingly legitimize arguments based on evidence that supports
limiting abortion access. Courts eventually place this research on par with the research
that justifies liberalizing abortion. Finally, it is an examination of how courts mobilize
expertise and evidence to establish new common sense “facts” about abortion: that life
begins at viability, that women experience negative mental health consequences with
their abortions, and that intact dilation and extraction is not a necessary procedure.
A. ROE V. WADE
1.

Medical Authority and Expertise in the Roe Court

In 1973, Roe dramatically altered the legal landscape for abortion in the United
States by instituting the trimester framework to evaluate laws impacting abortion
access: the Court held that, prior to the end of the first trimester, states should not
regulate abortion; after the end of the first trimester, states may reasonably regulate
abortion; and after the moment of viability, the state may proscribe abortion
altogether.23
The Roe Court continued a tradition that was established in the nineteenth century
of relying on medical evidence and expertise to shape the legal and regulatory
environment on abortion.24 However, in Roe and the many cases that followed, the
Supreme Court had to address a major issue: medical experts often take contradictory
positions with regard to abortion procedures and consequences. Crucially, rather than
argue that medical experts and evidence might be influenced by politics, society, and
culture,25 the Court helped to paint a picture of medical experts detached from their
social and political contexts. In doing so, the Court was able to defer to expertise
understood to be objective, neutral, and apolitical on a highly contested issue.26 The
insulation of physicians and mere deference to their unbiased expertise enabled the
political project of liberalizing abortion,27 while fulfilling the promise made at the

22
Indeterminacy is a contested idea in scholarship on legal reasoning. In this paper, I utilize the idea of
indeterminacy put forward in Karl Klare’s chapter, Critical Perspectives on Social and Economic Rights,
Democracy and Separation of Powers. Klare suggests that indeterminacy emerges from legal realism.
Indeterminacy allows an exploration of the embeddedness of knowledge and thus the limits of reason.
However, indeterminacy “does not entail the death of reason” nor does it suggest that ideology trumps all
else. Karl Klare, Critical Perspectives on Social and Economic Rights, Democracy and Separation of
Powers, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: CRITICAL INQUIRIES 3, 11-12
(Helena Alviar García et al. eds., 2015).
23
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973).
24
REAGAN, supra note 7.
25
In Roe, the physician appears as several characters: a complainant in the case, a practicing doctor,
and an expert that is part of a professional body governed by a code of ethics.
26
See PAULA A. TREICHLER, HOW TO HAVE THEORY IN AN EPIDEMIC: CULTURAL CHRONICLES OF
AIDS 15-39 (1999).
27
“[Justice] Blackmun saw medicine not only as a source of authority and expertise, but also as a
model of compassion, increasingly in a specifically political way. . . . He became an impatient critic of those
who sought to undercut reproductive rights . . . chastising his fellow Justices for their blindness to ‘another
world out there.’” Nan D. Hunter, Justice Blackmun, Abortion, and the Myth of Medical Independence, 72
BROOK. L. REV. 147, 189 (2006) (quoting Justice Harry J. Blackmun, Third Draft of Planned Parenthood of
Missouri v. Danforth 3 (June 6, 1976) (on file with The Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, The
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outset of the opinion: that the Court would consider the case of abortion “free of
emotion and of predilection.”28 In other words, through rationalizing the liberalization
of abortion in terms of medical science and evidence, the Court insulated itself from
accusations of acting politically. But first, the Court had to do the work to ensure that
medical science was secure from scrutiny.
2.

Setting the Stage: The American Medical Association as an Apolitical Institution

The Roe Court’s discussion of the American Medical Association’s (AMA’s)
shifting stance on abortion between 1857 and 1970 exemplifies how courts establish
medicine’s independent expert authority while acknowledging but minimizing the role
of historical, political, and social context.
The Roe Court began its discussion by presenting the AMA’s 1857 position that
abortion was a practice leading to the “destruction of human life.”29 The Court then
drew upon the 1871 Report on Criminal Abortion by the AMA’s Committee on
Criminal Abortion, which has a similar tenor:
[A]mong other things, that it ‘be unlawful and unprofessional for any
physician to induce abortion or premature labor, without the concurrent
opinion of at least one respectable consulting physician, and then always
with a view to the safety of the child-if that be possible,’ and calling ‘the
attention of the clergy of all denominations to the perverted views of
morality entertained by a large class of females-aye, and men also, on
this important question.’30
The decision jumps forward nearly 100 years to 1967 when the AMA softened its
position with a “policy of opposition to induced abortion, except when there is
‘documented medical evidence’ of a threat to the health or life of the mother . . . .”31
The Court ended its assessment of the AMA with the organization’s 1970 Judicial
Council opinion emphasizing that abortion is a medical procedure and the importance
of the role of medical experts in performing the procedure.32
According to the Roe Court, the AMA position did not change due to physicians’
political beliefs or shifting political, social, and cultural attitudes towards abortion.
Rather, physicians were simply responding to new developments in medical
knowledge:
When most criminal abortion laws were first enacted, the procedure was
a hazardous one for the woman. This was particularly true prior to the
development of antisepsis. . . . Thus, it has been argued that a State's real
concern in enacting a criminal abortion law was to protect the pregnant
woman, that is, to restrain her from submitting to a procedure that
placed her life in serious jeopardy.
Modern medical techniques have altered this situation. Appellants and
various amici refer to medical data indicating that abortion in early
pregnancy, that is, prior to the end of the first trimester, although not

Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 220, Folder 9))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
29
See id. at 142.
30
See id. (quoting 22 TRANSACTIONS AM. MED. ASS’N 38-39 (1871)).
31
See id. at 142-43 (citing Therapeutic Abortion, 116 PROC. AM. MED. ASS’N H.D. 40-51 (1967)).
32
See id. at 143-44 (citing William B. Steen et al., Resolution 31: Reaffirmation of AMA Official
Policy on Abortion, 24 PROC. AM. MED. ASS’N H.D. 220 (1970)).
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without its risk, is now relatively safe. . . . Consequently, any interest of
the State in protecting the woman from an inherently hazardous
procedure, except when it would be equally dangerous for her to forgo
it, has largely disappeared.33
By ascribing shifts in medical opinion to advances in medicine rather than
evolving political and social beliefs, the Court left open the possibility that physicians
have always simply acted on the best medical evidence of the day, uninfluenced by
social forces.34 Further, the decision ignored the possibility that the evidence itself may
emerge from social norms including concerns for women’s virtuousness or shifting
demographics. 35
The AMA’s treatment of changing opinion illustrates how the Court is able to
discursively separate politics from science when interpreting medical expertise and
evidence.36 This allowed the Court to liberalize abortion laws—arguably the goal of
the Roe Court—while insulating itself from scrutiny. As will be illustrated, in order to
establish the rigor of scientific objectivity the Court had to proceed in two steps. First,
it had to minimize, if not actively discredit, conservative physicians that filed a brief
arguing that life begins at conception. Second, and relatedly, the Court had to
downplay or ignore the oppositional nature of the medical amicus briefs.
3.

Deference to Medical Expertise: Viability

Examining a key question of medical import in the decision exemplifies how the
Court distinguished between medical authority that supported conservative or
progressive arguments to eventually justify liberalizing abortion. In Roe, the Court’s
analysis of the key medical question, “when is the fetus viable?” demonstrates the
Court’s efforts to insulate progressive medical expertise and evidence from external
scrutiny. The Court had before it both progressive and conservative claims about
abortion. For example, the brief for the Planned Parenthood physicians argued that
modern medical opinion regarded abortion as a procedure that should be available
without state-imposed restrictions as to permissible reasons, pointing out that on June
25, 1970, the House of Delegates of the AMA recommended that licensed physicians
be permitted to perform abortions in hospitals or approved clinics without restriction
after consultation with two other physicians.37
The brief of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists (ACOG)
similarly emphasizes the need for physicians to practice medicine without state
regulation. ACOG argued that “[a] decision to perform an abortion should be regarded
as strictly a medical decision and a medical responsibility. . . . [that] should be

33

Id. at 148-49.
See, e.g., D.A. O’Donnell & W.L. Atlee, Comm. on Criminal Abortion, Am. Med. Ass’n, Report on
Criminal Abortion, 22 TRANSACTIONS AM. MED. ASS’N 239, 256 (1871).
35
For example, the report highlights shifting demographics in America as well concern for the role of
women as mothers. Id. at 243-244; see also Nicola Beisel & Tamara Kay, Abortion, Race, and Gender in
Nineteenth-Century America, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 498 (2004) (Beisel and Kay argue that contestation around
abortion in the nineteenth century was primarily about control over the reproductive capacity of AngloSaxan women.)
36
Cf. LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT
JOURNEY 90 (2005) (discussing Justice Blackmun’s reliance on the medical history of abortion while writing
his draft opinion).
37
Supplemental Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. and American Ass’n of
Planned Parenthood Physicians as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 7018, 70-40), 1972 WL 126043, at *10-11.
34
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removed entirely from the jurisdiction of criminal law.”38
Pro-life physicians acting under the name “Certain Physicians, Professors, and
Fellows of ACOG” also asserted their own medical authority. Their primary goal was
to “urge [the] Court to consider the current medical and scientific evidence of the
humanity of the unborn . . . .”39 By keeping ACOG in its title, the group established
itself within the larger medical community and in turn as a legitimate voice of the
medical practitioner. Further, the group is careful to point out that many of their
physician members are fellows of ACOG and practicing physicians.40 These “Certain
physicians of ACOG” disagree with ACOG’s push for the decriminalization of
abortion in arguing that the fetus is an unborn child.
The Court, however, discounts the brief from these “certain” physicians in a
sweeping move:
The latter [life starting at conception] is now, of course, the official
belief of the Catholic Church. As one brief amicus discloses, this is a
view strongly held by many non-Catholics as well, and by many
physicians. Substantial problems for precise definition of this view are
posed, however, by new embryological data that purport to indicate that
conception is a ‘process’ over time, rather than an event, and by new
medical techniques such as menstrual extraction, the ‘morning-after’
pill, implantation of embryos, artificial insemination, and even artificial
wombs.41
The Court instead defers to physicians supporting the liberalization of abortion
laws,42 delegitimizing physicians who expressed an opinion against abortion:43
As we have noted, the common law found greater significance in
quickening. Physicians and their scientific colleagues have regarded that
event with less interest and have tended to focus either upon conception,
upon live birth, or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes
‘viable,’ that is, potentially able to live outside the mother's womb,

38
Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al., Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(No. 70-18), 1971 WL 128053, at *3.
39
Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae for of Certain Physicians, Professors, and Fellows of the American
College of Obstetrics and Gynecology Supporting Appellees, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 1971 WL 128057,
at *2 [hereinafter Brief of Certain Physicians].
40
Id.
41
Roe, 410 U.S. at 161.
42
For a progressive physician viewpoint, see Motion for Leave to File a Brief and Brief as Amici
Curiae for the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al., Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No.
70-40) 1971 WL 126685. Many physician amici emphasized anti-abortion legislation’s restriction not only
on patient choice, but also physician autonomy:

The rights of physicians to administer health care, and of patients to seek
medical treatment, are fundamental personal interests recognized by national and
international standards of medical practice, and protected by the First, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. . . . In reviewing legislation affecting the medical
profession, courts have particularly respected the knowledge and skill necessary for
medical practice, the broad professional discretion necessary to apply it, and the
concomitant state interest in guaranteeing the quality of medical practitioners.
Id. at *38.
43
For a pro-life physician viewpoint, see Brief of Certain Physicians, supra note 39, at *8 (“From
conception the child is a complex, dynamic, rapidly growing organism.”).
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albeit with artificial aid.44
In aligning themselves with progressive doctors the Court did not cite to the
progressive physician briefs. The Court did, however, cite to Williams Obstetrics, the
leading obstetrics textbook at the time. The authors of the textbook include Louis
Hellman and Jack Pritchard, two physician signatories to the ACOG amicus brief.
The Court actively worked to establish the medical independence of physicians
aligned with liberalizing abortion and then deferred to them. The Court portrayed the
physician as a neutral arbiter, and medical authority as objective and independent from
the courts. The decision ended on this note:
For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical
judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. . . . For the stage
subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in
promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses,
regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to
maternal health.45
Medical science emerged as an objective authority on questions of viability,
mental health, and abortion procedure. This enabled the Court’s decisions to appear
apolitical even in the context of competing claims.
4.

Ignoring Conservative Claims: Abortion and Mental Health

Unlike the later cases on abortion, the Roe majority ignored arguments placed
before it on the issue of negative mental health consequences of the procedure. The
Court faced conflicting claims on mental health and abortion. The brief by the (prolife) Certain Physicians of ACOG stated:
A World Health Organization scientific group concluded that “There is
no doubt that the termination of pregnancy may precipitate a serious
psychoneurotic or even psychotic reaction in a susceptible individual.”
Some investigators have indeed noted lasting psychiatric reactions.
However, there has been much variation in the medical literature
regarding the incidence of psychological sequelae to induced abortion.46
Instead of heeding the assertion that abortion has negative mental health
consequences, the Roe majority understood mental health concerns to be a factor
necessitating an abortion rather than as an outcome of abortion:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the
distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there
is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this
one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed
motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her

44

Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
Id. at 164.
46
Brief for Certain Physicians, supra note 39, at *55-56.
45
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responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.47
The Court’s unwillingness to give way to the argument that abortion causes
psychological harm is a signal of the Court’s desire to embolden the argument that
abortion should be liberalized. In Roe, it was Blackmun who played an important role
in ensuring that medical expertise was shielded from scrutiny in the course of the
decision. We can see the complex boundary work performed by Blackmun as he
isolated, insulated, and deferred to the medical authority that supported liberalizing
abortion.48 The Court analytically moved physicians and medical experts outside of the
politics of the abortion debates. In Roe, the insulation of evidence, and in turn the
Court, had strategic purpose: it allowed the Court to code its own political project in
terms of expertise, and reified the idea that medical practitioners and experts are
apolitical. In doing so, the Court was able to reach its own goal of rationalizing the
decision in a manner “free of emotion and predilection.”
Each of the abortion decisions that follow reveals how the Court manages the
relationship between the Court and medical expertise to accomplish the broader
political aim of increasing or decreasing access to abortion.
B. CASEY V. PLANNED PARENTHOOD
1.

Medical Authority in the Casey Court

Twenty years later, the Court reconfigured the Roe rule in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey. In Casey, the Court examined the constitutionality of five amendments to the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982: an informed consent requirement; a
twenty-four hour waiting period between the provision of certain information and the
abortion; parental consent for minors; spousal notification; and reporting requirements
for clinics.49 Three of these requirements had a “medical emergency” exception.50 The
Casey Court was clear on its desire to maximize the ability of the state to regulate
pregnancy.51 Casey discarded Roe’s trimester framework for regulating access to
abortion and replaced it with the “undue burden” standard.52 In Casey, the Court made
a slight move away from Roe’s protection of medical evidence that had shielded
liberalizing abortion from scrutiny. The Court deferred to progressive medical
authority on viability and medical emergencies, yet accepted conservative ideas on
abortion and mental health.
Several issues necessitated medical inquiry in Casey: When is a fetus viable?
What constitutes a medical emergency? Moreover, Casey became a pivot point for the

47

Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
Justice Blackmun asserts, “We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When
those trained in . . . medicine . . . are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the
development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.” Id. at 159.
“Nevertheless, the question simply reemerged in a different way. . . . Blackmun effectively had to decide
when the life of the fetus ‘began,’ at least to the extent of deciding when the state’s interest in protecting the
fetus became compelling.” Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade: An Engine of Controversy, in WHAT ROE SHOULD
HAVE SAID 3, 9 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).
49
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833 (1992).
50
Id. at 844.
51
See id. at 872 (“A [trimester] framework of this rigidity was unnecessary and in its later
interpretation sometimes contradicted the State’s permissible exercise of its powers.”).
52
Id. at 837 (“An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or
effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
viability.”).
48
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Supreme Court on an important and controversial question: Are there negative mental
health implications for abortion? The transition from Roe (abortion has no mental
health consequences) to Casey and onwards (abortion has mental health consequences)
was the outcome of the social and political organizing focused on mental health
beginning in the 1980s—the period between Roe and Casey.
2.

Deference to Medical Evidence and Expertise: Viability and Medical Emergencies

Viability remained a key consideration in Casey. The Court clearly articulated an
unwillingness to renounce the central principle of Roe: a woman should be allowed to
terminate her pregnancy before viability.53 After viability, however, the state has a
legitimate interest in the “life of the unborn” and thus the ability to restrict access to
abortion.54 In Casey, the Court acknowledged that viability is a shifting line
determined by medical progress in the field of neonatology, marked, in part, by the
ability of prematurely born fetuses to survive. In 1973, the date of the Roe decision,
the earliest point of viability was twenty-eight weeks.55 By the time of Casey, the point
of viability was found to be twenty-three or twenty-four weeks.56
We have seen how time has overtaken some of Roe’s factual
assumptions: advances in maternal health care allow for abortions safe
to the mother later in pregnancy than was true in 1973, and advances in
neonatal care have advanced viability to a point somewhat earlier.57
The Court saw shifting viability as an outcome of advances in medical practice.
The Court therefore deferred fully to medical evidence and expertise on the question of
viability, insulating itself from scrutiny on this question.
The Court treated “medical emergencies” similarly. In Casey, three of the
provisions examined by the Court provide exceptions for medical emergencies:
informed consent with a twenty-four hour waiting period; spousal consent for married
women;58 and parental consent for minors with the possibility of judicial bypass. A
“medical emergency” is defined as a:
[A] condition which, on the basis of the physician's good faith clinical
judgment, so complicates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as

53
Id. at 871 (“The woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most central
principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot renounce.”).
54
Id. at 869 (“The woman’s liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from the outset the State cannot
show its concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later point in fetal development the State’s interest in life
has sufficient force so that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted.”).
55
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (citing LOUIS M. HELLMAN & JACK A. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS’
OBSTETRICS 493 (14th ed. 1971)).
56
Casey, 505 U.S. at 860 (discussing the progression of science).
57
Id. (internal citations omitted).
58
The Court discusses the informed consent requirement in detail:
Except in a medical emergency, the statute requires that at least 24 hours before
performing an abortion a physician inform the woman of the nature of the procedure, the
health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the “probable gestational age of the
unborn child.” The physician or a qualified nonphysician must inform the woman of the
availability of printed materials published by the State describing the fetus and providing
information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child support from
the father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other services as alternatives
to abortion. An abortion may not be performed unless the woman certifies in writing that
she has been informed of the availability of these printed materials and has been provided
them if she chooses to view them.
Id. at 881 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990)).
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to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death
or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and
irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.59
In the context of the Pennsylvania act at issue, the Court stated that medical
emergencies are contingent on a physician’s good faith clinical judgment. However,
just as in Roe, this reasoning ignores the possibility that clinical judgment is often
variable—depending on the politics and beliefs of the individual physician.60
3.

Breaking From Progressive Medical Expertise and Evidence: Abortion and
Mental Health

Casey is a pivotal moment in the Court’s treatment of abortion and psychological
harm. The Casey Court moved away from the Roe Court’s assertion that psychological
harm may be caused by unwanted pregnancy. According to the Casey Court, the
abortion itself is what could psychologically harm a woman, if she is not adequately
informed:
It cannot be questioned that psychological wellbeing is a facet of health.
Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an abortion would
deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision.
In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences
of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the
risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with
devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully
informed.61
This major shift represents a substantial victory for pro-life activism that had been
building outside of the courtroom. Beginning in the 1980s, these anti-choice efforts

59

Id. at 879 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (1990)) (emphasis added).
Once again, the Court is faced with competing expert opinions about the questions at hand. As in
Roe, this is explicitly acknowledged in the physician briefs. In arguing for a reversal of Roe, the American
Association of Prolife Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AAPLOG) write that the fetus should be “rightfully
considered and treated as our second patient.” Brief for the American Ass’n of Prolife Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (AAPLOG) and the American Ass’n of Prolife Pediatricians (AAPLP) as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902), 1992 WL 12006428, at *6
[hereinafter Brief of AAPLOG] (quoting PRITCHARD & MACDONALD, WILLIAMS’ OBSTETRICS vii (16th ed.
1980)). To justify this position on medical grounds, the brief argues that “fetal diagnosis and therapy” is a
tool that obstetricians must posses. Id. The brief sets out to “provide the Court with a better understanding of
the true nature and risks of pregnancy, childbirth and abortion as they are viewed in modern obstetrical
practice. . . . [and] to correct many of the erroneous ‘medical facts’ set forth in petitioners' brief and that of
ACOG.” Id. at *2.
While acknowledging that doctors come from a variety of perspectives on abortion, ACOG argues that
state laws “should not interfere” with medical judgment:
[W]hen a patient seeks medical care and treatment, such as abortion, state laws should not
interfere with a health care provider's ability to exercise his or her best medical judgment
in treating that patient. . . . [T]he Pennsylvania statute challenged here seriously interferes
with a woman's ability, in consultation with her physician, to obtain an abortion . . .
Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al., Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(Nos. 91-744, 91-902), 1992 WL 120006402, at *1. In making this argument, ACOG relies on the validation
of only progressive medicine in Roe. Interesting to note is that the pro-life expert groups attempt to gain
legitimacy through their association with the larger entities from whom they break with ideologically. See,
e.g., Brief of AAPLOG, supra at *1. The physicians explicitly highlight that AAPLOG members are also
members of ACOG and that the Pro-Life Pediatricians are also members of the American Academy of
Pediatrics (AAP).
61
Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
60
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sought to tie abortion to negative mental health outcomes. The oft-cited moment
marking this tension was the 1987 directive from Ronald Reagan to his surgeon
general Everett Koop asking for a comprehensive report on the psychological and
medical impact of abortion on women.62 Betraying his reputation as a “pro-life”
Surgeon General, Koop responded by stating that there was not enough rigorous
evidence to make the case that abortion causes negative mental health outcomes.63
Taking a stronger position against the argument that abortion has negative mental
health outcomes, the American Psychological Association (APA) amicus brief to
Casey stated that it is the informed consent requirements that may produce negative
mental health effects.64 Rejecting the APA’s proposition, and implicitly rejecting the
Surgeon General’s analysis, the Casey Court chose to support the argument offered by
pro-life briefs: it is a lack of information about the abortion procedures and its
consequences that has negative mental health consequences post-abortion. This
“protectionist” position65 advocates that women require additional time in order to give
well thought-out consent.66 The Court’s deference to the pro-life advocates in Casey
betrayed its normative project and legitimized the pro-life position that abortion can
have mental health consequences.
Rather than bolstering the progressive legal and medical claims regarding
abortion, the Court’s reliance on conservative claims justified a new standard: undue
burden. The Court in Casey finds that the regulations did not constitute an undue

62

Nancy Adler et al., Psychological Factors in Abortion: A Review, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1194,
1194 (1992).
63
Id. at 1195.
64
Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Ass’n in Support of Petitioners, Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902), 1992 WL 12006399, at *4. The APA argues in its brief that:
These provisions confuse the purpose and process of obtaining “informed consent”
with that of pre-abortion counseling. . . . The inflexible “counseling” mandated by the
Commonwealth is likely to be contrary to the best interests of many women. First, some of
the state-mandated information is actually exaggerated and misleading. Contrary to the
impression conveyed by the Commonwealth's brochure, empirical research does not
support the contention that abortion is a significant risk factor for detrimental
psychological effects. Misrepresenting the psychological sequelae of abortion-particularly
when the psychological effects of its alternatives are omitted-may actually compromise a
woman's recovery from an abortion. Second, requiring counselors to give the same litany
of information to every pregnant woman, regardless of its relevance to or likely impact on
her, is the antithesis of effective counseling. Indeed, it may result in unnecessary anxiety,
stress and harm to many women. Further, the dictated information is biased-obviously
designed more to discourage a woman from choosing to terminate her pregnancy than to
inform her decision.
Id. Prompted by the increasing attention paid to the intersection of mental health and abortion by the
courts and in political discourse about abortion, the APA first began filing amicus briefs in 1983, filing a
brief for Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health. See id. at *1.
65
Siegel, supra note 8, at 1642-43 (arguing, while relying on dignity arguments, that the Supreme
Court is shifting from fetal-protective arguments to woman-protective arguments. However, the Court’s
current mobilization of women’s protective arguments based on a stereotypical idea of women’s roles do not
forward a women’s rights agenda.) Id.
66
The Court does not cite to physician briefs, but rather to pro-life advocates such as the Feminists for
Life and Legal Action for Women. See Brief of Feminists for Life of America et al., as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents & Cross Petitioners, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902), 1992 WL
12006409, at *8-9 (“In addition to the obvious physical complications, abortion has a profound
psychological impact upon many women that can be found in the testimonies of women who have
undergone abortion. Since the absolute safety of abortion, whether in the first trimester or thereafter, cannot
be established, there is no justification for complete deregulation of the procedure. The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania must be allowed to protect the woman considering abortion by requiring that she be given an
opportunity to give a meaningful consent.”).
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burden, and that they are justified by the state’s interest in protecting the would-be
mother.67 In doing so, the Court set the stage for laws driven by conservative rationales
to enter into the courtroom discussion on abortion.
C. STENBERG V. CARHART
1.

Medical Authority in the Stenberg Court

In 2000, eight years after Casey, the Court heard Stenberg v. Carhart. Stenberg
concerned a Nebraska statute banning “partial-birth abortion,” a procedure defined by
the statute as:
[A]n abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion
partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the
unborn child and completing the delivery.68
The statute contained an exception for the life of the pregnant woman, but not for
the health of the woman.69 Leroy Carhart, a physician who performed clinical
abortions, challenged the law.70 The first contested medical question before the Court
focused on the partial-birth abortion procedure itself, specifically comparing the intact
Dilation and Extraction (“Intact D&X”) and the non-intact Dilation and Extraction
(“D&X”).71 A D&X procedure may involve disarticulation of the fetus prior to its
excavation.72 During an Intact D&X procedure, the physician does not disarticulate the
fetus prior to removing it from the uterus, but rather collapses the skull either to bring
the fetus feet first through the cervix or to bring the skull out first followed by the rest
of the fetus intact.73 The Court grappled with whether Intact D&X is ever necessary
and, in turn, whether a health exception was required.74 The Court declared the statute
unconstitutional on two grounds: first, the law lacked an exception for the
“preservation of the health of the mother”; and second, it imposed an undue burden on
a woman’s ability to choose the necessary abortion procedure, “thereby unduly
burdening her right to choose abortion itself.”75
2.

Conflicting Expertise: Intact versus Non-Intact Dilation and Extraction

The Stenberg Court relied heavily on medical testimony and expertise to
understand the procedures and risks they pose to women. Immediately, however, the
Court had to find a way to adjudicate between numerous competing sources of
opinion, each deemed to be medically and scientifically authoritative, but providing
differing advice, guidance, and knowledge on the actual procedure. In the face of

67
The only amendment found to constitute an undue burden by the Casey Court is the “husband
notification” provision. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 837-38.
68
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000) (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 28–326(9) (Supp. 1999)).
69
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28–328(1) (Supp. 1999).
70
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922.
71
Throughout this paper, I will use “Intact D&X” for a procedure in which the fetus is left largely
intact through the abortion procedure. “D&X” will be used for an abortion procedure that requires
disarticulation prior to removal of the fetus.
72
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 927.
73
Id.
74
See generally id. at 931-37 (examining the medical evidence regarding the advantages and possible
necessity of a D&X procedure).
75
Id. at 930 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874, 879 (1992)).
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conflicting data, the Court became an arbiter of medical and health knowledge.76
The Court had before it, for example, competing expert testimony and evidence
from the district court as well as amicus briefs submitted by numerous organizations
including the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons (AAPS) and the
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG). The AAPS sought to
prevent a health exception while ACOG supported a health exception. In each case, the
physician claims filter through differing political and moral viewpoints of each
organization. The AAPS submitted its brief alongside many pro-life physicians
organizations. Each pro-life medical organization validated its own medical expertise
through the claim that its physicians engaged in medical practice and by referencing a
larger moral and ethical frame—Christianity or the Hippocratic Oath.77 Together the
amici argue that they represent “medical realities” of “partial-birth abortion.”78 These
amici do not recognize the intact D&X procedure, and proffer that it is not the standard
or preferred method under any circumstance. 79
Unlike prior cases, the Court implicitly placed these two physician positions
(those who seek to liberalize abortion versus those who seek to limit access) on par
with one another by simply acknowledging the differing medical opinions as holding
equal potential influence and legitimacy. Rather than insulating one set of ideas as
medically factual and discounting the other with near silence, as the Roe Court did, the
Stenberg Court’s equalization of divergent expert positions made it necessary for the
Court to arbitrate medical expertise and experience.80 In doing so, the Court
legitimized the arguments of physicians who sought to limit access to abortion and
placed them on par with physicians that sought to liberalize abortion. This had several
outcomes: First, the Court recalibrated the field to include the range of scientific and
medical argumentation produced by each group of physicians; and second, the Court
legitimated the arguments put forward by the anti-choice physicians:
For another thing, the division of medical opinion about the matter at
most means uncertainty, a factor that signals the presence of risk, not its
absence. That division here involves highly qualified knowledgeable
experts on both sides of the issue. Where a significant body of medical

76
Id. at 935 (“We do not quarrel with Nebraska's argument, for Nebraska is right. There are no general
medical studies documenting comparative safety.”). See also Michael J. Perry, Religion, Politics, and
Abortion, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing contestation between frames, particularly
religious, mobilized in constitutional debates on abortion).
77
In doing so, they authorize their own expertise and validate their membership as a group of experts.
See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Ass’n of American Physicians and Surgeons et al. in Support of Petitioners,
Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 99-830), 2000 WL 228448, at *3 (“Amicus Curiae New Jersey
Physicians Resource Council (“NJPRC”) is an association of 45 New Jersey physicians which provides
insight on medical, ethical and social issues for policymakers, medical professionals and the public. NJPRC
does not believe that partial birth abortion is ever medically indicated to save the life of the mother or to
protect her future fertility.”)
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Further adding to the complexity of the Court’s role in utilizing medical expertise is the statement of
the American Medical Association:
According to the scientific literature, there does not appear to be any identified
situation in which intact D&X is the only appropriate procedure to induce abortion, and
ethical concerns have been raised about intact D&X. The AMA recommends that the
procedure not be used unless alternative procedures pose materially greater risk to the
woman. The physician must, however, retain the discretion to make that judgment, acting
within standards of good medical practice and in the best interest of the patient.
HEALTH & ETHICS POLICIES OF THE AMA H.D. § H-5.982(2).
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opinion believes a procedure may bring with it greater safety for some
patients and explains the medical reasons supporting that view, we
cannot say that the presence of a different view by itself proves the
contrary. Rather, the uncertainty means a significant likelihood that
those who believe that D & X is a safer abortion method in certain
circumstances may turn out to be right. If so, then the absence of a
health exception will place women at an unnecessary risk of tragic
health consequences. If they are wrong, the exception will simply turn
out to have been unnecessary.81
This explicit acknowledgement of a divided body of literature is important as we
approach Gonzales v. Carhart, in which the Court cited to non-medical anecdotal
evidence partly due to a perceived lack of clarity amongst medical experts.82
3.

Recalibrating the Stage: All Evidence is Objective Evidence

Because the majority opinion never fundamentally questioned the idea of medical
objectivity on either side of the case, Stenberg Court laid the foundation for pro-life
physicians to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the Court and the public.
The Stenberg majority saw the split in medical evidence as a signal to err on the
side of caution:
But where substantial medical authority supports the proposition that
banning a particular abortion procedure could endanger women's health,
Casey requires the statute to include a health exception when the
procedure is “‘necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother.’”83
Despite the progressive outcome of the case, the Court made a radical shift that
has changed the terrain of assertions of medical fact and evidence: the Court treated
opposing physician perspectives on abortion as equally legitimate.84 This has reset the
discussion of medical expertise and evidence and evened the playing field for
conservative and progressive voices. It has allowed for a complete transformation at
the state level: now rather than insulating progressive medicine as apolitical and

81

Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937.
See infra Part D.
Id. at 938 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992)).
84
Language plays an important role in the decision. The use of particular words codes the political
leaning of the Justices. In Stenberg, the language is chosen carefully, in line with what has been deemed
medical standard language by the AMA and ACOG. In other words, the language itself betrays the political
outcome of the decision. In Stenberg, the words “partial-birth abortion” appear only in the majority decision
in quotes and the word “dismemberment,” signaling the tearing apart of a human, is replaced with
“disarticulation,” a word that signals a medical procedure. The dissenting Justices from Kennedy to Scalia,
however, code their decision in line with the language used by the conservative AAPS that uses the language
of partial-birth abortion without quotations in turn signaling the dissent’s political positioning. For example,
Kennedy states immediately in the context of his dissent that “[t]he Court's failure to accord any weight to
Nebraska's interest in prohibiting partial-birth abortion is erroneous and undermines its discussion and
holding.” This is remarkably apparent in his call for allowing laws that promote the life of the “unborn.”
Stenberg, 530 U.S. 957 (“The political processes of the State are not to be foreclosed from enacting laws to
promote the life of the unborn and to ensure respect for all human life and its potential.”).
The actual language of the decision and the words to describe the procedure change as each Justice
makes his or her statement on abortion. These politics encoded in the language used in the decision and the
dissent signal the political positions taken by the justices in Stenberg as the language of the AAPS and antichoice groups find its way into the majority decision.
82
83

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2508890

102

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 41 NO. 1 2015

rigorous, the door has been opened for a full normative debate coded in credible
scientific expertise on both sides.
D. GONZALES V. CARHART
1.

Medical Authority in the Gonzales Court

Gonzales v. Carhart examined the constitutionality of the federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (“PABA”) and revisited the issues initially presented in
Stenberg.85 Amongst the key issues in the case was whether the late-term abortion
procedure ban was unconstitutional because it lacked a health exception for the
mother.86 The Court ruled that the ban was not unconstitutional because the legislation
should be read narrowly as only barring Intact D&X, and thus did not place any
woman at immediate health risk because other late-term abortion procedures could be
performed instead.87 Further, the Court rationalized that the scienter requirement for
physicians allowed performance of the procedure where absolutely necessary if the
physician had not begun the procedure with the intent to perform Intact D&X.88
The Gonzales decision reflected the new post-Stenberg terrain of medical
expertise. Even though the Stenberg opinion produced a progressive outcome from the
standpoint of pro-choice activists and advocates, it also rewrote the boundaries of
“reliable” and “objective” medical evidence by legitimizing conservative medical
expertise and evidence Stenberg reset the terms of the conversation: pro-life and prochoice medical testimony and expertise could legitimately be treated as equal. This
was a dramatic shift from the early abortion jurisprudence that discounted pro-life
medical assertions almost entirely. Now, all evidence and expertise was equal, and all
was subject to interrogations of ideological bias and all were equally capable of being
deemed objective.
2.

Conflicting Expertise: Intact versus Non-Intact Dilation and Extraction

There are several key questions requiring scientific and medical expertise in the
Gonzales decision that recall the deliberations in Stenberg. First, the Court grappled
with the procedure itself, raising questions about the safety and efficacy of the Intact
D&X procedure.89 If the Court found the Intact D&X to be safer and more efficacious,
the Court could consider granting a health exception that would allow Intact D&X to
be performed when necessary.90
Justice Kennedy began his opinion in Gonzales by citing testimony from
Congressional hearings, including that of a nurse testifying before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. The nurse attended a late term procedure and described what she
observed:
The baby’s little fingers were clasping and unclasping, and his little feet
were kicking. Then the doctor stuck the scissors in the back of his head,
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Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 133 (2007).
See id. at 161-63 (discussing the contradictory opinions concerning the medical necessity of a D&X
procedure).
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Id. at 165.
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See id. at 155.
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Id. at 136.
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Id.
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and the baby’s arms jerked out, like a startle reaction, like a flinch, like a
baby does when he thinks he is going to fall.91
The Court treated the testimony as a description of the methodology of the
medical procedure. After describing the nurse’s testimony, Kennedy’s language shifted
from a discussion on Intact D&X to a discussion on the various methods of “killing the
fetus.”92
The Court, however, still had to distinguish Gonzales from Stenberg in order to
find the PABA constitutional. After all, the Stenberg Court erred on the side of a
cautionary exception for women’s health in the face of what it considered to be
conflicting medical evidence.93 As in Stenberg, the parties in Gonzales made
competing factual claims about the safety, efficacy, and necessity of the Intact D&X.
The Court once again acknowledged these contradictions when the Gonzales majority
stated that “there is documented medical disagreement whether the Act's prohibition
would ever impose significant health risks on women.”94
The Court’s discussion of conflicting medical opinions stemmed partly from the
physicians who filed opposing briefs. For example, ACOG stated:
The medical advantages of [Intact D&Xs] are now widely
acknowledged. As reflected by hearings before Congress and in the
courts, the safety advantages of the intact variant are recognized by an
array of skilled physicians with impeccable credentials and vast clinical
experience. These safety advantages are confirmed by leading medical
texts and peer-reviewed studies; the curricula of leading medical
schools; and even some of the Act's supporters—including the
Government's own witnesses. Indeed, as medical practice has evolved in
the nine years since ACOG first formulated its policy on [Intact D&X],
and in the six years since this Court decided Stenberg, the medical
consensus about these safety advantages has grown. Against this
backdrop, the consequences of the Act's failure to include an exception
for procedures necessary to protect a woman's health are clear.95
ACOG depoliticizes its argument for a health exception by highlighting the
expertise of the individuals reviewing the medical facts and literature on the Intact
D&X procedure.
A task force convened by the Executive Board reviewed the medical
facts surrounding the issue and drafted a proposed policy statement. The
task force consisted of practicing obstetrician-gynecologists, who were
“carefully select[ed] . . . based on their expertise and viewpoint” —
ACOG “chose task force members from diverse backgrounds.”
Members included, among others, specialists in treating high-risk
pregnancies and physicians who regularly performed or oversaw
abortions, including [Intact D&Xs]. The task force also included at least
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Id. at 138-39.
Id. at 139.
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Id. at 144 (“The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed. Like the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, it concluded that the absence of a health exception rendered the act unconstitutional. The
Court interpreted Stenberg to require a health exception unless ‘there is consensus in the medical community
that the banned procedure is never medically necessary to preserve the health of the woman.’”).
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Id. at 162.
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Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 2867888, at *2-3.
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one physician who opposed abortion.
. . . [T]he task force concluded that [Intact D&X] could be the safest or
most appropriate procedure for a given patient, and that the decision
whether to choose such a procedure should be left to a woman and her
physician. The task force presented this conclusion to ACOG's
Executive Board in a draft Statement of Policy.
The Executive Board includes, among others, nationally elected officers,
and elected representatives from each of ACOG's nine geographic
districts and one district made up of members of the Armed Forces. . . .96
The expert group compiled by ACOG produced the following statement:
A select panel convened by ACOG could identify no circumstances
under which [Intact D&X] . . . would be the only option to save the life
or preserve the health of the woman. An intact D&X, however, may be
the best or most appropriate procedure in a particular circumstance to
save the life or preserve the health of a woman, and only the doctor, in
consultation with the patient, based on the woman's particular
circumstances can make this decision. The potential exists that
legislation prohibiting specific medical practices, such as intact D&X,
may outlaw techniques that are critical to the lives and health of
American women.97
A similar display of expert knowledge legitimized pro-life physician
organizations. In a move that mimicked progressive strategies for discounting
conservative science, conservative physicians suggested that ACOG relied on
physician’s subjective experiences rather than rather than going through a proper peerreview process. For example, in arguing that the Intact D&X is never required, the
American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AAPLOG) and
congressmen who support the “partial birth abortion ban” stated the following:
The absence of empirical evidence to support the safety of D&X is
reflected in the three papers on which Respondents rely for all their
“data” to support D&X: Haskell's (not peer-reviewed), McMahon's (not
peer-reviewed), and Chasen's. Haskell's 1992 paper was neither peerreviewed nor controlled; it was simply a compiled series of his own
personal experience.98
The pro-life argument that physicians favoring a women’s health exception fail to
proffer objective empirical evidence spurred a reaction from other amici. For example,
the amicus brief of the Women’s Medical Association and Medical Students for
Choice attempts demonstrate why and how peer-reviewed studies are not always
possible in the surgical context:
Surgery, by its nature, does not fit the randomized control trial (“RCT”)
paradigm. When a new technique is first developed, there is simply no
way to create a sufficient number of “trials” to conduct a controlled
study. Even after a new surgical technique has reached a level of
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Id. at *8-9.
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acceptance in the surgical community, circumstances often continue to
preclude such evaluation. However, despite substantial impediments to
controlled studies, the level of knowledge and skill in the surgical
profession has exploded in the past century because the surgical
community has developed a field-specific approach: it engages in
widespread communication regarding common problems, theoretical
approaches and ultimately practical solutions. When a surgeon finds a
technique that represents an improvement over prior techniques, he or
she records the results and shares them with others, who then begin to
perform the new technique and share their experience.
This is the way numerous now familiar procedures were introduced and
evaluated when they were new and untested. The safety and health
benefits of [Intact D&X] have been demonstrated in the same manner.
Accordingly, as each of the lower courts to have addressed Congress's
findings has concluded, “credible medical evidence” does, in fact, exist
to show that [Intact D&X] is not only safe and effective, but it is often
safer than alternative methods of terminating pregnancy in the second
trimester.99
Two aspects of the debate in the briefs are worth noting. First, the arguments by
amici are familiar in public health literature, and they signal a sophisticated
engagement of conservative physicians and activists in scientific and medical
discourse. In other words, in a debate about a contentious public health issue, one
group will typically argue that there is one form of evidence, more likely than not the
randomized control trial, that is the only rigorous, objective, and generalizable form of
data—the gold standard for public health evidence on the contested issue. The
responding side, unable to produce this evidence for a variety of reasons, argues that it
is impossible to collect data in the requested form.100 For example, in the late-term
abortion context randomized control trials are not the standard utilized by surgeons to
assess the efficacy of new procedures.101
This back-and-forth frames how we understand some forms of medical evidence
as more legitimate than others in the law and policy making process. Typically, it is
progressives demanding more rigorous evidence, undermining the research upon
which conservative claims are made. Interestingly, in the abortion context, however,
this familiar debate puts progressives on the defensive, arguing that it is impossible to
produce the evidence demanded of them. This defensive posture is the opposite of how
progressive advocates on health imagine themselves. In other words, progressives tend
to imagine themselves as having the good, rigorous evidence on their side and
conservatives as manufacturing ideologically oriented data.102 The debate in the lateterm abortion context, however, reveals that, at least in some cases, it is conservatives
who successfully make accusations of weak evidence against progressives. Second, a
careful study of evidence put forward by both sides reveals that both pro-life and pro-
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Brief for American Medical Women's Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at *3,
Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-1382).
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Compare, e.g., id. at *22 (arguing that the procedure does not fit into standard randomized control
trials, but that there is still evidence from clinicians regarding its safety), with Brief for AAPLOG, supra
note 98, at *22-23 (arguing that there is a lack of empirical data to support the procedure’s safety and
necessity).
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Brief for American Medical Women's Ass’n et al., supra note 99, at *22.
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See, e.g., Brief of AAPLOG, supra note 98.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2508890

106

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 41 NO. 1 2015

choice advocates betray their own demands for “rigorous data” by consistently
invoking “lower standards” of evidence as legitimate.
The Court shows deference to congressional fact-finding surrounding PABA.103
Congress asserted the following facts in the PABA: first, partial birth abortions pose
serious risks to women undergoing the procedure; second, there is no credible
evidence that partial birth abortions are safer than other procedures; third, a
“prominent medical organization” has found that partial birth abortions are not a
medically accepted procedure; fourth, partial birth abortion is never necessary to
preserve the health of a woman; fifth, partial birth abortion is never medically
necessary according to the doctor who developed the medical procedure; and sixth,
banning the procedure is good for a woman’s health.104 These factual findings led
Congress to conclude that:
[P]artial-birth abortion is never medically indicated to preserve the
health of the mother; is in fact unrecognized as a valid abortion
procedure by the mainstream medical community; poses additional
health risks to the mother; blurs the line between abortion and
infanticide in the killing of a partially-born child just inches from birth;
and confuses the role of the physician in childbirth and should,
therefore, be banned.105
Further, Congress weighed in on the quality of the evidence available:
There is no credible medical evidence that partial-birth abortions are
safe or are safer than other abortion procedures. No controlled studies of
partial-birth abortions have been conducted nor have any comparative
studies been conducted to demonstrate its safety and efficacy compared
to other abortion methods. Furthermore, there have been no articles
published in peer-reviewed journals that establish that partial-birth
abortions are superior in any way to established abortion procedures.
Indeed, unlike other more commonly used abortion procedures, there are
currently no medical schools that provide instruction on abortions that
include the instruction in partial-birth abortions in their curriculum.106
The Court validated these congressional assertions. Unlike in Stenberg, where the
Court and Congress took the conflicting evidence as a sign to err on the side of a
woman’s health exception, in Gonzales, the Court deferred to Congress’ ability to
legislate in the face of medical uncertainty.
The reality, that no body of evidence on late-term abortion meets the rigorous
evidentiary standards of the randomized control trial, opens the door to a greater range
of evidence. In Roe and Casey, where the Court portrayed the medical establishment as
objective and neutral, the Justices were able to defer to medical expertise and
evidence. In the post-Stenberg context, however, because the Court leveled the playing
field, judges must now arbitrate medical evidence and expertise. Courts pick and
choose which facts are relevant, continuing to draw and redraw the boundaries of what
is rigorous medical evidence and what is not.107
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See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165-66 (discussing how to consider congressional findings).
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3.

The Psychological Impact of Abortion

Once again in Gonzales the psychological impact of abortion was on the table. In
the post-Stenberg environment, divergent expertise provided an opportunity to make
new findings of fact and legitimate new truths about abortion. In Gonzales, the court
promulgated the idea that women experience negative mental health consequences
because of their abortions. In making this assertion, the Court cited to the Sandra Cano
Brief. The Cano Brief began by elucidating the expertise the amici bring—expertise
largely driven by personal experience:
Amici Sandra Cano is the “Doe” of Doe v. Bolton. It was Doe v. Bolton
which provided for the health exception and led to partial-birth abortion
and abortion on demand. While it is unusual for a successful litigant to
file an amicus brief opposing the health exception which was the heart
of her case, Mrs. Cano in fact never wanted an abortion in Doe v. Bolton
and fraud was perpetrated on the Court. Her Affidavit is Appendix A. . .
Other amici are 180 post-abortive women who have suffered the adverse
emotional and psychological effects of abortion. Congress in its findings
only discussed the physical health consequences of abortion. However,
other health consequences not stated in Congress' findings would be
helpful to the Supreme Court in making its decision. The women attest
to the fact that there are adverse emotional and psychological health
effects that have affected their lives. All of the women have used their
full name in the original Affidavits, but some have requested that only
their initials be used publicly to protect their confidentiality.
Although the Supreme Court only made non-evidence based
assumptions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton because abortion was
generally not legal or widespread, the post-abortive women amici
provide this Court with their real life experiences and attest that abortion
in practice hurts women's health. Post-abortive women were asked,
“How has abortion affected you?” . . .108
Importantly, the Cano brief stated, amongst other points, that abortion is a cause
of negative mental health experiences.109 Kennedy cited to the brief to make a new

“very experienced” medical experts explained that, in certain circumstances and for certain
women, intact D & E [intact D&X] is safer than alternative procedures and necessary to
protect women's health. The District Courts' findings merit this Court's respect. Today's
opinion supplies no reason to reject those findings. Nevertheless, despite the District
Courts' appraisal of the weight of the evidence, and in undisguised conflict with Stenberg,
the Court asserts that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act can survive “when . . . medical
uncertainty persists.” This assertion is bewildering. Not only does it defy the Court's
longstanding precedent affirming the necessity of a health exception, with no carve-out for
circumstances of medical uncertainty; it gives short shrift to the records before us,
carefully canvassed by the District Courts. Those records indicate that “the majority of
highly-qualified experts on the subject believe intact D & E [intact D&X] to be the safest,
most appropriate procedure under certain circumstances.”
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 179-80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
108
Brief of Cano et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No.
05-308).
109
For a discussion of competing narratives about women’s experiences with abortion See Linda
McClain, Equality, Oppression, and Abortion: Women Who Oppose Abortion Rights in the Name of
Feminism, in FEMINIST NIGHTMARES: WOMEN AT ODDS 159, 160-61 (Susan Ostrow Weisser & Jennifer
Fleischner eds., 1994).
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finding of fact in the abortion context:
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love
the mother has for her child. The Act recognizes this reality as well.
Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral
decision. While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it
seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their
choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe
depression and loss of esteem can follow.110
Kennedy’s citation to the Cano Brief is particularly interesting for scholars
attempting to understand the Court’s use of medical expertise. Rather than grapple
with conflicting evidence, Kennedy detoured around the literature and cited to a brief
filled with first person anecdotes about women’s health. The briefs were collected in
part by the Justice Foundation, an organization that collects testimonies of women
about their experiences with abortion through its “Operation Outcry” ministry. The
ministry’s explicit goal is to end “the pain of abortion by expositing the truth about its
devastating impact on women, men, and families.” 111
In her dissent, Justice Ginsberg reacted strongly to Kennedy’s assertion:
Revealing in this regard, the Court invokes an antiabortion shibboleth
for which it concededly has no reliable evidence: Women who have
abortions come to regret their choices, and consequently suffer from
“[s]evere depression and loss of esteem.” Because of women's fragile
emotional state and because of the “bond of love the mother has for her
child,” the Court worries, doctors may withhold information about the
nature of the [Intact D&X] procedure.112
Ginsberg’s dissent acknowledged that the academic literature actively contests the
growing data on abortion and negative mental health consequences. The dissent cited
numerous studies demonstrating that a vast majority of the literature did not support
Kennedy’s conclusions about abortion’s negative mental health consequences.
Interestingly, however, the dissent’s citation contains a “but see” citation to academic
work claiming that abortions can have negative mental health consequences.113
Although it is found in Ginsberg’s dissent, we can read this “but see” citation as a
validation of a literature on abortion and negative mental health consequences. It is a
signal that this literature can no longer be ignored despite an enormous amount of
criticism with regard to methodology.
The debates on abortion and mental health are contentious—with both sides
drawing on evidence that is often, but not always, published in mainstream medical
and public health journals. The pushback featured in the Gonzales dissent took the
classic form of debates in public health law research --- accusations of infidelity
towards rigorous research against a claim based on anecdotes. Although these critiques
are often successful when progressives levy them, in Gonzales it was the anti-choice
advocates who successfully put pro-choice advocates on the defensive by mobilizing
first person narratives to generate widespread support and create an opening for the
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Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159.
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Feb. 18, 2015).
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Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 183 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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literature on mental health and abortion to enter.114 The Court’s treatment of
conservative advocacy, emanating from both physicians and activists, as on par with
that evidence supporting liberalizing abortion, contributes to the legitimation of
conservative ideas about abortion. In other words, the Court plays a central role in
resetting the playing field on expertise and evidence in the abortion debates.
III. FROM THE SUPREME COURT TO THE STATE: TEXAS MEDICAL
PROVIDERS PERFORMING ABORTION SERVICES V. LAKEY
With the Court shaping and producing ideas about abortion, and legitimating
conservative claims, we see an increase in regulations that limit abortion access.115 In
other words, this new “knowledge” about abortion, legitimized by the Court, now
structures access to abortion services.116 The litigation surrounding the 2011 Texas
Women’s Right to Know Act (WRKA) is an example of how newly minted facts
impact the regulatory environment and impede access to abortion services. While
informed consent pertaining to public health has a long history in U.S. common law,
the discussion on informed consent in the abortion context largely emerged from
attempts to prevent access to abortion.
In 2011 Texas passed House Bill 15, which requires:
the physician “who is to perform an abortion” to [perform and] display a
sonogram of the fetus, make audible the heart auscultation of the fetus
for the woman to hear, and explain to her the results of each procedure
and to wait 24 hours, in most cases, between these disclosures and
performing the abortion.117
A woman may choose not to receive verbal explanation of the results of the sonogram
if she falls into one of three exceptions: (1) if the woman is pregnant as a result of rape
or incest that “has been reported or not reported because the woman fears retaliation
resulting in serious bodily injury”; (2) if she is a minor utilizing judicial bypass
procedures “to avoid parental notification”; or (3) if she has a fetus with an
“irreversible medical condition or abnormality.”118
In Lakey, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit overturned the lower court’s
decision enjoining enforcement of WRKA, acting on Gonzales’s assertion that
abortion’s negative mental health consequences justify heightened informed consent

114
In the Gonzales decision it is relevant to note that the language Kennedy uses actively signals the
politics of the opinion: to uphold restrictions on abortion procedures. For example, the “some doctors” may
“kill the fetus”; in another instance Kennedy expresses that “[i]t is, however, precisely this lack of
information concerning the way in which the fetus will be killed that is of legitimate concern to the State.”
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159. Kennedy also often utilizes the language of “dismemberment” rather than
“disarticulation.” The latter was utilized by the Stenberg majority and the former by its dissent. Thus the
very language of the decision betrays the political outcome, signaling to the lawyers and advocates the
political persuasion of the decision.
115
See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 4 (discussing state laws requiring counseling and/or waiting
periods prior to receipt of abortion services).
116
For a discussion of a similar phenomenon in the area of gay rights, see Libby Adler, Just The Facts:
The Perils of Expert Testimony and Findings of Fact in Gay Rights Litigation, 7 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL
LEFT 1 (2011); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument
from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994).
117
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 2012). See
also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(B)-(D) (2011).
118
Lakey, 667 F.3d at 578 n.6. “A woman may decline to view the images or hear the heartbeat, but she
may decline to receive an explanation of the sonogram images only on certification that her pregnancy falls
into one of three statutory exceptions.” Id. at 573 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.0122(b)-(d)
(2011)).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2508890

110

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 41 NO. 1 2015

standards. The Lakey court reproduced the entirety of the Gonzales passage on
abortion having negative mental health effects, making these negative health effects a
“fact” that has traveled from conservative assertions outside the judiciary in the 1980s,
to the Supreme Court’s holdings in both Casey and Gonzales, and finally into state
laws on abortion.119 This new “fact” helped the circuit court justify the increased
informed consent requirement because it could prevent, amongst other harms,
psychological risks to the mother. The Fifth Circuit also found that the actual
information conveyed to the patient did not constitute an undue burden given that it is
the conveyance of medical knowledge from the provider to the patient.120
The Fifth Circuit was not naïve to the political projects that undergird the
production of evidence. In fact, the court sought to distinguish between the “medical”
and the “ideological”:
H.B. 15 requires the taking and displaying of a sonogram, the heart
auscultation of the pregnant woman’s fetus, and a description by the
doctor of the exams’ results. That these medically accurate depictions
are inherently truthful and non-misleading is not disputed by Appellees,
nor by any reasoned analysis by the district court.121
The Fifth Circuit cited to the Merriam-Webster definition of “ideological” in order
to defend what it saw as medically factual (and thus non-ideological) information:
At times, the district court characterizes these disclosures as
“ideological,” but the court misunderstands the term. Speech is
ideological when it is “relating to or concerned with ideas” or “of,
relating to, or based on ideology." . . . The distinction the court there
sought to employ was between factual information and moral positions
or arguments. Though there may be questions at the margins, surely a
photograph and description of its features constitute the purest
conceivable expression of “factual information.” If the sonogram
changes a woman’s mind about whether to have an abortion – a
possibility which Gonzales says may be the effect of permissible
conveyance of knowledge – that is a function of the combination of her
new knowledge and her own “ideology” (“values” is a better term), not
of any “ideology” inherent in the information she has learned about the
fetus.122
The court’s reliance on “truthful” medical information resonates with the early
medical cases on abortion, albeit with a different outcome. By isolating medical
knowledge, the Lakey court drew a boundary between fact and ideology. This time,
however, the conservatives benefit from the fact/ideology distinction while the
progressive position is dismissed.
This decision exemplifies how after Gonzales, and given today’s political climate
surrounding abortion, we must read Blackmun’s defense of medicine differently in
Roe. Over thirty years later, the insulation of medicine does not support the
progressive cause, but the conservative one. Rather than insulate medical knowledge
for the sake of increasing access to abortion, we are now insulating medical knowledge
to limit access to abortion and forward a conservative political project.
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PART IV: A RETURN TO FEMINIST SKEPTICISM
Can the reproductive justice movement, emerging from the history of the feminist
women’s health movement, return to critique of medical evidence and expertise? In the
face of an increasingly destabilized medical evidence and evidentiary base, I argue that
this change is necessary to recalibrate reproductive justice lawyering and activism. In
this section I offer a background to the feminist women’s health movement and offer
suggestions for a new style of regulatory engagement.
A. THE WOMEN’S HEALTH MOVEMENT: SKEPTICS, BELIEVERS, AND EXPERTS
The current political environment demands rethinking the feminist reproductive
rights mantra that a woman’s health is “between the woman and her doctor.” In this
contemporary feminist imaginary about the physician-patient space, the physician is
equipped with objective, neutral, apolitical medical and scientific evidence about the
woman’s body.123 The doctor conveys this knowledge to the woman in an unbiased
manner at which point she makes a decision about her care.124 This framing assumes
the neutrality of medical practitioners and the evidence they draw on.125 The current
posture of the reproductive justice movement betrays the critical feminist impulse
towards evidence and expertise that began the feminist women’s health movement. 126
Conservative organizations, including anti-choice groups, however, have long seen
through this ideation of the physician-patient relationship. In fact, some of the most
effective means to prevent access to abortion are not based on an assumption that the
physician-patient space is unregulated, but rather on a recognition that it is highly
regulated. In the informed consent context alone, the state regulates a wide range of
interactions between providers and patients. For example, the state mandates reading
scripts about abortion and the fetus to patients, waiting periods between patient
counseling and abortion services, displaying ultrasounds to the pregnant woman,
discussing negative psychological consequences of abortion, and performing
transvaginal ultrasounds.127 In some jurisdictions regulations also require that the
physician display ultrasounds and sonograms and that the woman must look at the
image unless there is a “look-away” exception in effect.128 In other words, these laws
seek to regulate the physical movement of the woman and her physician in the clinic.
In acknowledging this high level of regulation, anti-choice activists have effectively
worked to shift the clinical environment by shaping the information physicians give to
their patients. Progressives should mobilize regulatory interventions to further
liberalize access to abortions. This counter strategy will not be based on a belief that
evidence-based approaches will lead to determinate outcomes, but rather will find its
foundation in feminist skepticism towards knowledge production.
A return to feminist skepticism necessitates a consideration of how feminist
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See generally Maya J. Goldenberg, On Evidence and Evidence-Based Medicine: Lessons from the
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organizing related historically to ideas of medical expertise and evidence.
The feminist women’s health movement began in the 1960s and 1970s, and was
premised on second-wave feminist ideas.129 In short, and at the risk of understating the
movement’s complexity, feminist women’s health activists saw scientific knowledge
as knowledge by and about men.130 The feminist women’s health movement was
pivotal in generating expert knowledge of women’s bodies and women’s health.
Women’s health activists historically mobilized two simultaneous and contradictory
positions in the context of advocating for greater attention to women’s health issues.
First, there was the position that the establishments that produce knowledge about
health are not objective. Instead, these knowledge producers—scientists, doctors, and
epidemiologists—exist in patriarchal structures that conceptualize health through the
male body.131 The activists promoted a politics of “difference and inclusion,” and
women sought to be included in medical research and knowledge.132 Second,
paradoxically, women’s health activists appeared to support the idea that knowledge
could be objective, as long as it was inclusive of women.133 In other words, at its root,
the women’s health movement did not seek to undermine entirely the institutions
against which they fought. The activists primarily sought to make medical and
scientific knowledge more complete, more thorough, and more accurate. The women’s
health movement sought to do so as it engaged with the various disciplinary streams of
science, medicine, and epidemiology.134 In arguing for the inclusion of women’s
bodies in scientific and medical research as a means to get accurate information about
women’s health, feminist health activists reified the idea that scientific evidence can be
produced in an objective, neutral manner. This was so even while the very act of
challenging the public health, medical, and scientific establishments through legal and
broader activism signaled an underlying distrust in the ability of these institutions to
produce objective and determinate knowledge.
There are several oft-cited victories of the women’s health movement, including
the liberalization of abortion law. First, there was Roe v. Wade. While the women’s
health movement advocated for abortion, Roe marked an important moment in which
the broader feminist sex-equality movement took up the women’s health agenda.135
Other major victories came in the realm of HIV and at the National Institutes for
Health (NIH) in the 1990s. In 1993 Congress passed the NIH revitalization act, which
required the inclusion of women and minorities in all NIH-funded research.136 In the
1990s feminist lawyers also demanded the inclusion of female-specific identifiers
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amongst the list of AIDS defining illnesses.137 This became another feminist victory
when the Centers for Disease Control amended its list to include female-specific AIDS
defining illnesses.138
A deeper critique of evidence and expertise began as post-modernist strains of
feminist engagement took hold amongst feminist activists and scholars. The postmodern turn inside of the women’s rights movement questioned the objectivity and
determinacy of science itself. Would the inclusion of women’s bodies result in a more
rigorous knowledge of women’s bodies? Or, must the production of knowledge itself
be deconstructed? Feminist philosopher of science Donna Haraway famously critiqued
the idea that there is a privileged view on “the inside” of science. Haraway argued that
all scientific knowledge is contingent on the social construction of science, coining the
term “the god trick” to identify the opposing belief that there is vantage point from
which scientists could be fully objective.139 This move in feminist understandings of
science, the move toward seeing the knowledge produced from studies as “situated”140
and subject to critique, would subject even the most inclusive studies to
interrogation.141 Although the internal feminist debates continue, two key lessons can
be extracted from the posture of feminist health activists towards knowledge
production that can continue to shape the contemporary women’s health movement.
First, the production of knowledge itself is situated. We cannot treat medical evidence
and expertise as inherently objective and neutral. Second, we should interrogate the
institutions that engage in the production of knowledge about women’s health
including courts and clinics. Revisiting these feminist critiques provides a new way
forward for the reproductive justice movement and for rethinking abortion advocacy.
B. RETHINKING THE STRATEGY FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: REGULATORY REFORM
PROPOSALS
Contemporary feminist health activists seem reticent to accept the thesis that
feminists historically championed in the context of feminist health advocacy: that
evidence is the product of the social and political environment from which it
emerges—and law plays a role in shaping this evidence. Similarly, rather than view
institutions—for example, hospitals—as products of legal regulations informed by the
political evidentiary landscape and thus central to the attainment of reproductive
justice, feminists today view institutions and the individuals that comprise them as
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capable of functioning apolitically and neutrally. I argue that a new vision of
reproductive justice must recognize the clinical space as highly regulated and work to
shape it for progressive purposes.142 We must take into account how knowledge, when
created and deployed, orders access to abortion.143
Unlike feminists, anti-choice activists have become incredibly effective at
regulating the doctor-patient relationship in the abortion context. Coded in the
language of safety and risk, the informed consent regulations and the shifting
evidentiary base on mental health and abortion show a deep understanding
operationalized by the anti-choice movement—that institutions, expertise, and
evidence can be influenced from the inside out. The resistance of feminist legal
activists to truly deconstruct the political formations that comprise institutions has
undermined the reproductive justice movement.
Understanding that institutions, such as clinics, are shaped by regulations provides
the necessary foundation for a new reproductive justice framework. This
understanding moves us beyond thinking that a clinic in any way can be a regulationfree zone. Further, it requires us to pay attention to how regulations of institutions are
justified through the invocation of medical and scientific expertise and knowledge.
Perhaps most demanding, it requires us to see how the law is not necessarily driven by
evidentiary claims, but rather helps produce them.
By viewing the sites of abortion and other pregnancy-related services as structured
by the regulatory environment, we can rethink the reproductive justice strategy with
regard to regulation. This view challenges the feminist refrain: “between a woman and
her doctor.” That refrain seeks to establish a zone of privacy in the medical clinic or
hospital setting in which women can get information about abortion free from
politics.144 Abortion rights activists, for example, critique abortion “scripts” on the
ground that they interfere with the sanctity of the space between women and their
physicians. It is necessary to dismantle the idea of public/private divide that is built
into this conception of the physician-patient relationship. Dismantling this dichotomy
is crucial because it animates political projects and underpins legal strategy while
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foreclosing the possibility of social and regulatory reforms that will enable access to
abortion services.
Instead, advocates can derive legal reform strategies by viewing the clinic as a
highly regulated space. New strategies for reproductive justice could not only counter
pro-life regulations but could also make the clinical environment safer for women
seeking abortion. Conceptualizing the clinic as a space that can be regulated generates
a range of legal strategies that are otherwise foreclosed by the current ironic feminist
faith in institutions as neutral, objective, and apolitical.
New regulatory interventions designed to improve abortion access could build out
of the current political, regulatory, and evidentiary climate. These suggestions are not
foolproof. These suggestions may even fail given our current political environment, in
which courts are arguably more conservative, medical evidence and expertise
supporting a progressive perspective has been destabilized by counter literature, and
anti-choice groups wield enormous amounts of financial and political power. They are
worth considering, however, because these suggestions move the reproductive justice
movement head on into the regulation debates.
I propose three suggestions for regulatory intervention. First, states could mandate
disclosure by all pregnancy-related providers of the types of services that are
available—including whether abortions are available and accessible at the given
facility. This mandate will target non-abortion providers, such as Crisis Pregnancy
Centers (CPCs), who misleadingly suggest that abortions are provided in order to draw
women in and then dissuade them from getting an abortion. Second, progressive
activists could offer modified scripts for providers given the contested domain of
“facts” regarding abortion. Third, states could mobilize their health care licensing
regulations to regulate all abortion counselors (borrowing from a successful strategy to
improve HIV counseling and care). These recommendations move the focus of
abortion legal advocacy away from privacy, towards regulation as a new way of
addressing access to abortion services. This new focus on regulation avoids wading
into the newly controversial territory of medical evidence and informed consent. Given
the political and social context in which abortion lawmaking occurs, one cannot
guarantee that these strategies would necessarily withstand the scrutiny of a court or
public ideologically opposed to abortion. The strategies do, however, take into account
the concerns raised by this paper about the Court’s treatment of medical evidence and
expertise.
1.

Mandatory Disclosure of Services for All Pregnancy-Related Service Providers—
Including Those That Do Not Provide Abortions

The first proposal is to make mandatory the disclosure of available (and nonavailable) services at all facilities providing pregnancy-related services.145 This
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This proposal raises First Amendment concerns. Attempts to regulate CPCs have been met with
mixed success. See e.g., Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233 (2nd Cir. 2014) (holding that
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Amendment, whereas requirements that CPCs disclose: (1) whether or not they provide referrals for
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Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2013) (reversing
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Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
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proposal builds on ongoing advocacy.
Women seek abortion-related services in clinics or in abortion specific servicing
centers. These can include a hospital or a stand-alone abortion clinic. CPCs are
pregnancy service providers that do not provide abortion despite the misleading
nomenclature of “crisis pregnancy center.” CPCs are designed to look like abortion
clinics but have the goal of deterring women from abortion through “pro-life”
counseling.146 In this manner, the CPCs are actually roadblocks for women attempting
to access abortion services.
The existence of clinics that provide services and are forced to disclose statemandated information about abortion, alongside CPCs, creates a confusing
environment, where it may be difficult for women seeking to end pregnancies to
navigate their options. Reproductive health and justice organizations are reticent to
join the battle over regulating provider speech fearing that it would backfire. This
concern is now outdated—regulations, including informed consent standards, largely
operate to block abortion access. To counter this, progressive health lawyers should
propose regulations that mandate physicians and service providers to disclose services
provided to enable access to quality abortion care. For actual abortion providers, this
would mean stating to women that an abortion can be obtained at the facility. For
CPCs, this requirement would mandate clarifying that abortions will not be provided.
This proposal addresses the concerns raised by this paper by sidestepping the
debate on medical “facts” that has produced conservative victories, and instead
focusing on making clinical and provider environments transparent to the women
accessing services.
2.

Offer Moderated Language on Abortion Consequences

Aware of the politics of the “facts” in the abortion context, a second strategy is to
offer a moderated statement of abortion’s potential consequences rather than the
current script that is meant to scare or dissuade women from abortions. For example,
in accordance with the Texas WRKA, a woman is offered the following information in
a booklet:
You should know that women experience different emotions after an
abortion. Some women may feel guilty, sad, or empty, while others may
feel relief that the procedure is over. Some women have reported serious
psychological effects after their abortion, including depression, grief,
anxiety, lowered self-esteem, regret, suicidal thoughts and behavior,
sexual dysfunction, avoidance of emotional attachment, flashbacks, and
substance abuse. These emotions may appear immediately after an
abortion, or gradually over a longer period of time. These feelings may
recur or be felt stronger at the time of another abortion, or a normal

For further discussion of First Amendment concerns raised by this proposal and related litigation, see
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birth, or on the anniversary of the abortion.147
In contrast, guidelines from the United Kingdom Royal College of Obstetrics and
Gynecologists (RCOG), provide that “[w]omen with an unintended pregnancy should
be informed that the evidence suggests that they are no more likely to suffer adverse
psychological sequelae whether they have an abortion or continue and have the
baby.”148 Further, the guidelines instruct, “[w]omen with an unintended pregnancy and
a past history of mental health problems should be advised that they may experience
further problems whether they choose to have an abortion or to continue with
pregnancy.”149
While equivocal, the RCOG deemphasizes the shock value of the litany of
consequences required by the Texas law. Further, given the current political
environment, the RCOG moderates the pro-life assertions of gross harm post-abortion.
Most importantly, the RCOG reports the current state of information on mental health
without embellishment. A moderated script might also state clearly the politically
contentious environment in which that abortion evidence is produced.
3.

Regulate All Abortion Service Providers—Including Pregnancy Counselors

A final proposal would be to regulate all abortion counseling under health care or
other licensing and regulation statutes. Currently, many individuals who provide
private abortion-related counseling services are not deemed to be health care
providers.150 Thus a vast amount of abortion counseling is not regulated and the
individuals providing counseling are not licensed. Licensing, even when largely
regulated by the profession, could have the effect of moderating extreme statements in
the context of pregnancy services.
This is not a novel approach. HIV counseling guidelines, for example, may
advise or require particular counseling and testing protocols.151 By defining “provider”
broadly in the context of HIV testing, states have brought a range of actors under
regulatory oversight.152 Similarly, broadening regulation of abortion counseling would
bring CPCs into the purview of state control and oversight by public health agencies.
This regulatory oversight may moderate the statements made by CPCs.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to see how the evidentiary terrain of abortion is legitimized, validated,
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and co-produced by the courts, we must analyze the political, economic, and social
forces that structure courts and clinics. Reproductive justice and rights advocates must
re-assess the reliability of public health, scientific and medical expertise as the basis
for a determinate strategy for progressive abortion reform. In other words, progressive
lawyers cannot presuppose the stability of public health, scientific, and medical
expertise and evidence as a foundation for pro-choice activism.
Rethinking how our current knowledge environment shapes regulations in the
abortion context requires us to look beyond clinics as a private space and towards the
idea that the clinic is a vulnerable institution. Rather than decry the regulation of
clinics, progressives should take up the regulation of provider-patient interaction with
consideration of the current political and evidentiary climate. Progressive lawyers must
think beyond “between a woman and her doctor” to reveal new strategies for
improving abortion access.
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